In games with costly signaling, some equilibria are vulnerable to deviations which could be "unambiguously" interpreted as coming from a unique set of Sender-types. This occurs when these types are precisely the ones who gain from deviating for any beliefs the Receiver could form over that set. We show that this idea characterizes a unique equilibrium outcome in two classes of games. First, in monotonic signaling games, only the Riley outcome is immune to this sort of deviation. Our result therefore provides a plausible story behind the selection made by Cho and Kreps' (1987) D1 criterion on this class of games. Second, we examine a version of Crawford and Sobel's (1982) model with costly signaling, where standard refinements have no effect. We show that only a Riley-like separating equilibrium is immune to these deviations.
Introduction
In Sender-Receiver games, out-of-equilibrium beliefs can be thought of as the Sender's hypothesis of what the Receiver would think upon observing a deviation. This hypothesis rationalizes the Sender's anticipation of what the Receiver would do, in turn justifying the Sender's decision not to deviate from the equilibrium. Even though out-of-equilibrium beliefs should not be taken too literally, equilibrium refinements often prescribe exactly what those beliefs should be, instead of stopping at conditions that rationalize the Sender's actions.
In this paper we show that strong predictions neither require, nor necessarily follow from, such specific impositions on beliefs. Rather than refining the set of admissible beliefs, we ask whether it is possible for the Sender to implicitly signal a candidate set of deviating types, even if he cannot anticipate exactly which beliefs the Receiver would form over that set. A Credible Deviation is one that uniquely and unambiguously identifies a set of types that gain from deviating, provided that the Sender anticipates the Receiver to form some beliefs over that set. We analyze the extent to which equilibria are immune to such deviations in costly-signaling games.
Our results concern two classes of signaling games. In Section 3 we show that in monotonic signaling games, only the least-distortive separating (or Riley) equilibrium outcome is immune to the Credible Deviations we describe. Therefore, on this particular class of games, there is a connection between the predictions made by standard refinements (D1, stability) and immunity to Credible Deviations. That is, our concept provides one behavioral motivation for selecting the stable outcome on this class.
Section 4 considers a class of signaling games whose structure is like Crawford and Sobel's (1982) , but with costly messages. Similar to the previous model, only a "Riley-like" equilibrium is free of Credible Deviations. In contrast, standard refinements widely used in practice (e.g. D1, D2, Divinity, etc.) can have little predictive power here.
An example
Consider the Sender-Receiver game in Figure 1 . The Sender privately knows whether he is a "Quantitative" type or not; both types are equally likely from the Receiver's (prior) perspective. The Sender must choose an action: whether or not to get an MBA.
If the Sender gets an MBA, the employer (Receiver) sees this message and decides whether to promote the Sender to Head of Human Resources (HR), to promote him to Chief Financial Officer (CFO), or to keep him at his current job (Assistant) with a pay raise. If the Sender does not get an MBA, the game ends. The Receiver would like to promote an MBA in a way corresponding to his type. Neither type wants to be promoted to HR, while only a Quantitative type would like to be CFO. It profits both Sender types (and the Receiver) to get an MBA and a raise with no promotion.
There are three kinds of (pure strategy) equilibria in this game.
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In one, both Sender types get an MBA, and due to the balanced prior beliefs, the Receiver keeps the employee as an Assistant. In another, only the Quantitative type gets an MBA, which leads to promotion to CFO. In the third, no Sender type gets an MBA. This outcome is supported by the Sender's anticipation that the Receiver would promote an MBA to HR with sufficiently high probability. In turn, this means the Sender thinks the Receiver will believe that only (or with high probability) non-Quantitative types get an MBA.
We now argue that the latter kind of equilibrium is not robust to the possibility that an out-of-equilibrium message can be interpreted as an implicit statement about the Sender's possible type(s). Before doing so it is worth noting that, perhaps surprisingly, all three equilibria satisfy various refinements commonly used in the literature, such as the Intuitive Criterion, D1, and even Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) stability. Proofs of this are available upon request.
Suppose that the "no MBA" pooling equilibrium is being anticipated by the Receiver, and consider the possibility that if the Receiver sees the outof-equilibrium choice "get MBA," he interprets it as the following (implicit) statement: "I am the Quantitative type." Would this be credible?
If the Receiver were to believe this (implicit) statement, he would choose the CFO action. Therefore the Quantitative type would gain from the Receiver's trust in this statement. The non-Quantitative type however would not. In this sense, this implicit statement is credible: the Quantitative type is precisely the only one who would want to "send" it.
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On the other hand, "get MBA" cannot credibly convey the statement "I am the non-Quantitative type." The Receiver's trust in this statement would cause him to choose HR, under which the non-Quantitative type does not gain. In fact neither type would gain if the Receiver believed such a statement.
Finally, consider the possibility that if the Sender gets an MBA, he is trying to convey the less precise statement: "I am either the Quantitative type or the non-Quantitative type." In order to determine whether or not this is a credible statement, we need to predict how the Receiver would respond to it. More precisely, we need to determine what the Sender anticipates the Receiver to believe about the likelihood of types in order to predict a response.
One could argue that, due to the credibility of the "I am Quantitative" speech, it should be less likely for a Quantitative type to send this less precise message.
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On the other hand, one could admit the possibility that the two types have different abilities to perform forward induction reasoning (which have not been explicitly modeled here). For example, the Quantitative type could be more likely to be able to perform this reasoning, which would make this type more likely to have sent the message. A third, more stringent approach would be to explicitly assume that the Receiver simply updates his prior using Bayes' rule when evaluating such a potential implied statement.
Since receiving this out-of-equilibrium message is a counterfactual event, we see little justification for prescribing any single, particular belief over the two types when evaluating this speech. In fact, we view the Sender's anticipation of the Receiver's posterior beliefs as being ambiguous. Therefore as a first approach, we use a max-min criterion to evaluate preferences when Sender types are deciding whether to deviate. This means that, in this example, we ask whether both types would gain from conveying this less precise message, regardless of the beliefs formed by the Receiver.
If the Receiver puts enough weight on the probability that the Quantitative type is trying to make this speech, the Receiver would choose CFO. As argued above, the non-Quantitative type would not gain in this scenario. Similarly, with beliefs sufficiently biased toward the non-Quantitative type, the Receiver would choose HR, making both types regret the deviation. Therefore neither type would unambiguously gain from conveying this third statement, undermining its credibility.
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To summarize, if we interpret the message "get MBA" as an implicit attempt to convey information about a candidate set of types, only one such message is credible: "I am the Quantitative type." The uniqueness of this credible message makes this equilibrium vulnerable to a deviation which can be "unambiguously" interpreted to be coming from a unique set of possible Sender-types, namely the singleton "Quantitative type."
In more general games, we say that an equilibrium is vulnerable to a credible deviation if there is an out-of-equilibrium message m through which the Sender can convey the following statement. (This "speech" is not really made by the Sender; it is implicitly communicated through m.)
"By sending this out-of-equilibrium message m, I am signaling that my type belongs to the set of types C. If you form any belief over C and take a corresponding best response, then any type θ ∈ C is guaranteed to be better off than he would have been in equilibrium. Conversely, for any remaining type θ / ∈ C, there exists a belief over C (and your corresponding best response) that would make θ worse off than in equilibrium. That is, C is precisely the set of types that gains regardless of the beliefs you form, as long as those beliefs are over C. Moreover, given message m, this speech cannot be made for any other set C ."
The existence of such a message m and set of types C makes the equilibrium in question less plausible than others. Under a mild notion of forward induction, it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy for the Receiver, upon seeing m, to behave as if the Sender's type is in C.
In this argument, we do not prescribe specific posterior beliefs for the Receiver following the receipt of m. As discussed following the example of Figure 1 , this even allows for the possibility that the Sender's type is correlated with the ability to perform this forward-induction reasoning. If the Receiver admits the possibility of such correlation, it is unclear how he would update his beliefs without specifying a more detailed model. It is even less clear how the Sender should anticipate the Receiver's understanding of this possibility. Since we think of the Receiver's posterior beliefs simply as a way to rationalize the Sender's equilibrium behavior, a theory with fewer specific assumptions on these posterior beliefs is more appealing.
The ideas outlined above may appear similar to certain concepts used in the literature on equilibrium refinements. We postpone comparisons to this literature to Section 2.2, after we formalize our definitions.
Sender-Receiver Games
Our main results concern two different classes of 2-player, Sender-Receiver games with costly signaling. Since those two classes share some structure, we introduce their shared notation here.
The Sender has private information that is summarized by his type θ ∈ Θ = {θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ n } ⊂ R. For notational convenience, we order the types so that θ 1 < θ 2 < · · · < θ n . The commonly known prior probability that the Sender's type is θ is π(θ). Upon realizing his type, the Sender chooses a message m ∈ R + . A strategy for the Sender is a function M : Θ → R + . After observing any message m, the Receiver chooses an action a ∈ R. A strategy for the Receiver is a function A : R + → R. The Sender and Receiver receive respective payoffs of u S (θ, m, a) and u R (θ, m, a), which are both continuously differentiable in (m, a). A Sender-Receiver game is given by the tuple (Θ, π, u S , u R ).
The Receiver's (posterior) beliefs upon receiving the Sender's message is a function µ : R + → (Θ), where (Θ) refers to the set of probability distributions on Θ. For any message m ∈ R + and any fixed (posterior belief) distributionπ ∈ (Θ), denote the Receiver's best responses to m (giveñ
Assumptions made below guarantee the non-emptiness of this correspondence. In a standard abuse of notation, for any set of types T ⊆ Θ we write BR(T, m) ≡ π∈∆T BR(π, m), which can be thought of as the Receiver's rationalizable actions knowing only that θ ∈ T .
The triplet (M, A, µ) is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if it satisfies the usual incentive compatibility and consistency conditions.
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This concept puts no restrictions on beliefs following out-of-equilibrium messages.
When an equilibrium (M, A, µ) is clearly given in context, we denote the Sender's equilibrium payoff (as a function of his type) as u *
Formalizing Credible Deviations
We ask whether the Sender, upon sending an out-of-equilibrium message m, can induce the Receiver to reason that it must have been sent by a type within some set C. Under our definition, this reasoning is justified when C is precisely the set of Sender types that would benefit from deviating to m, whenever the Receiver plays any best response to m with beliefs restricted to C. An equilibrium is Vulnerable to a Credible Deviation if, for some out-of-equilibrium message, there is a unique such C.
Definition 1 (Vulnerability to a Credible Deviation) Given an equilibrium (M, A, µ), we say that an out-of-equilibrium message m ∈ R + \M (Θ) is a Credible Deviation if the following condition holds for exactly one (non-empty) set of types C ⊆ Θ.
We call C the (unique) Credible Deviators' Club for message m. If such a message exists, the equilibrium is Vulnerable to a Credible Deviation.
The fact that (1) is an equality (as opposed to, say, the inclusion relation C ⊇) enforces the precision mentioned above. The uniqueness requirement on C given m makes our invulnerability condition weaker. If two such sets, C and C , existed for m then it would be arbitrary for types in C to assume that the Receiver would restrict beliefs to C, and not to C (or even C ∪ C ). However, all of our results would hold even if C is not required to be unique.
We use a max-min criterion to evaluate the Sender's preferences because it is unclear how the Receiver should form beliefs over C (see Section 1.1). We view this as a natural starting point, though alternate definitions could be considered. For example, one could require only that the Receiver possess a single, "worst-case" belief over C that dissuades each θ / ∈ C from deviating.
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It turns out that this weaker condition would yield the same results as our definition for the models in Sections 3 and 4. On the other hand, games exist in which this alternate version has no bite and ours does.
Relation to the refinements literature
Immunity to Credible Deviations may appear similar to certain equilibrium refinements used in the literature, but there is no general, logical relation between these concepts and our condition. We explore this below.
Perhaps the least controversial refinement is the Intuitive Criterion (see Cho and Kreps (1987) ). It deems an equilibrium implausible whenever some Sender type would gain from deviating to an out-of-equilibrium message, as long as the Receiver makes the minimal assumption that it was sent by types that could potentially benefit.
Definition 2 (Intuitive Criterion) For a given equilibrium (M, A, µ)
and out-of-equilibrium message m ∈ R + \ M (Θ), denote by J(m) the set of types whose equilibrium payoff is higher than any payoff they could get by sending m, as long as the Receiver plays a rationalizable action, i.e.
The equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion (via m) if J(m) = Θ and
Inequality (2) says that by sending m, at least one type θ gains unambiguously so long as the Receiver restricts his beliefs to Θ \ J(m). This restriction on the Receiver's beliefs is a very minimal requirement, since no type in J(m) could gain by sending m if he anticipates any rational reaction from the Receiver. Given this restriction, the Intuitive Criterion merely checks for the existence of some type θ / ∈ J(m) who, anticipating such beliefs, would gain unambiguously compared to his equilibrium payoff.
This concept differs from Vulnerability to Credible Deviations in two ways. First note that in eqn. (1) the Receiver's beliefs are restricted more than in eqn. (2). This makes it easier to find deviating types in (1) than in (2), making the Intuitive Criterion a relatively weak concept. Second, however, consider which types should not have an incentive to deviate. While eqn. (2) merely requires non-emptiness of the set of deviators, eqn. (1) precludes types outside C from wanting to perform certain deviations. This makes it harder to find a deviating set (club) in (1) than in (2), making the Intuitive Criterion a relatively stronger concept.
On the classes of games studied in this paper (or any Sender-Receiver game with only two Sender types), the Intuitive Criterion is weaker than Immunity to Credible Deviations. There are, however, games in which the Intuitive Criterion rules out an equilibrium which is immune to Credible Deviations.
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In certain important classes of Sender-Receiver games with more than two Sender types (e.g. Spence (1973) ), the Intuitive Criterion does not reduce the set of equilibrium outcomes. This has led to, among others, a wellknown concept that makes specific requirements on posterior beliefs. The D1 Criterion (see Banks and Sobel (1987) , Cho and Kreps (1987) , Cho and Sobel (1990) ) requires the Receiver to disbelieve that a deviating message could be sent by a type θ who weakly gains "less often" (i.e. under fewer a ∈ BR(Θ, m)) than some other type θ strictly gains.
Definition 3 (D1 Criterion) An equilibrium (M, A, µ) fails the D1 Criterion if there exists an out-of-equilibrium message
As has been observed in the literature (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991a) , p. 460), there is little intuitive justification for the Receiver to put infinitely more weight on Sender types that gain from the deviation "more often" (θ ) than others (θ). While there are arguments against the "speeches approach" as well (e.g. the Stiglitz Critique), one could argue that a missing behavioral motivation is a disadvantage of this practically useful refinement.
This motivates our study of monotonic signaling games (Section 3). We show that D1 eliminates an equilibrium if and only if it is Vulnerable to Credible Deviations. Hence the Riley outcome can be justified by an intuitive, plausible robustness check: Immunity to Credible Deviations. While we reject the same equilibrium outcomes that D1 eliminates, we do not impose any specific restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. On the other hand, D1 has little predictive power in a class of non-monotonic signaling games we study (Section 4), while our condition still selects a unique outcome.
A related notion is that of Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) Stability. In generic Sender-Receiver games all Stable equilibria satisfy the D1 Criterion; furthermore the two concepts are equivalent on the class of discrete monotonic signaling games, resembling the continuous one we study in Section 3 (see Cho and Sobel (1990) ). In contrast, on the general class of SenderReceiver games, the Stability of an equilibrium neither implies nor is implied by its immunity to Credible Deviations.
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Our motivation for Credible Deviations has a flavor similar to the motivation behind Grossman and Perry's (1986) Perfect Sequential Equilibrium (PSE). Roughly speaking, under PSE a set of types T breaks an equilibrium with an out-of-equilibrium message m if all types in T improve their payoff by sending that message as long as the Receiver believes that all (and only) the types in T would always deviate and send m. The word always here implies that the Receiver is specifically assumed to update his priors over T in accordance with Bayes' Rule. This amounts to replacing BR(C, m) with BR(π| C , m) in the right-hand side of eqn. (1).
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In Section 1.1, we argued against doing this. When considering the case C = {Quant, Non-Quant} in that example, PSE would specify that the Receiver use precisely his prior beliefs, which in turn would cause him to choose the action "Assist." Since both types prefer this outcome, this set of types C would break the pooling equilibrium under PSE. However, C = {Quant} would also break the equilibrium under PSE by inducing the action "CFO". Therefore, when beliefs over C are required to coincide with the prior distribution, the Receiver is implicitly forced to ignore the possibility that C is the deviating set. We find this inconsistent.
More generally, our opinion is that such specific assumptions off the equilibrium path are too prescriptive. While we can think of equilibrium play (and the resulting beliefs) as being self-enforced by, say, repeated interaction, pre-play communication, or even explicit agreement, there is less justification for this reasoning off the equilibrium path.
Even on the standard class of monotonic signaling games, Perfect Sequential Equilibria may not exist; see Sec. 10.6 of van Damme (1991) . We examine that same class in Section 3, and characterize a single equilibrium outcome as being immune to Credible Deviations. It is worth noting, however, that if an equilibrium is Vulnerable to a Credible Deviation by a singleton C, then it also fails PSE, since only one belief can be formed over a singleton set.
Relatedly, Farrell's (1993) Neologism-proofness asks whether a set of types can credibly distinguish itself in cheap-talk games by explicitly sending an out-of-equilibrium message that self-identifies a set of potential deviating types, T . An equilibrium fails Neologism-proofness if the types in T are precisely the ones who gain when, in response to the message, the Receiver's beliefs are a Bayesian update of his prior beliefs on T . This concept is analogous to PSE, so the above comparisons apply.
Monotonic Signaling Games
Monotonic signaling games (Spence (1973) ) capture situations in which: the Sender would prefer the Receiver to take higher actions; the Receiver prefers his action to be correlated with the Sender's type; and it is relatively less costly for higher Sender types to send higher messages. These games exhibit multiple equilibria. In applications, refinements such as D1 or Stability are used to select a unique outcome, the least-distortive separating (or Riley) outcome.
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In this section we show that this outcome is the only one immune to Credible Deviations.
Following Cho and Sobel (1990) and Ramey (1996) , monotonic signaling games are defined as follows. First, u S (θ, m, a) is strictly increasing in a for all (θ, m). One can think of a as some sort of compensation for the Sender; all Sender types always prefer more. In order to avoid solutions involving arbitrarily large messages and actions we assume that lim m→∞ u S (θ, m, a) = −∞ for all θ and a.
We assume that u R is such that, for any type θ and message m, the Receiver has a unique best response, i.e. that BR({θ}, m) is a singleton. Throughout Section 3 we denote this action as {β(θ, m)} ≡ BR({θ}, m). Furthermore we assume that β(·, ·) is uniformly bounded from above. We assume that ∂u R /∂a is strictly increasing in θ for all (m, a). As a result, BR(π, m) is greater for beliefs that are greater in the first-order stochastic sense, and in particular, β(θ, m) is strictly increasing in θ (Cho and Sobel (1990) , p. 392). Together with monotonicity, this captures the idea that the Sender wants to induce the Receiver to choose larger actions by trying to convince him that his type is greater.
We make a central assumption in Spencian signaling games, the singlecrossing condition: −(∂u S /∂m)/(∂u S /∂a) is strictly decreasing in θ. That is, for a given increase in m, in order to keep the Sender at the same utility level, a higher Sender-type needs less compensation in terms of a (in case m is locally costly for the Sender) or he is willing to give up a larger amount of a (in case m is locally beneficial for him).
Finally, we assume that u S (θ, m, β(θ, m) ) is strictly quasiconcave in m. In many applications, this assumption is implied by stronger assumptions made directly on the primitives of the model.
Most applied signaling models have a lot more structure. For example, since m is usually interpreted as a costly action undertaken by the Sender that may be beneficial for the Receiver (e.g. the Sender's education level), it is often assumed that u S (θ, m, a) is weakly decreasing in m and β(θ, m) is weakly increasing in m. We need not impose these conditions. An additional piece of notation simplifies the exposition. For any θ and m, letâ(θ, m) be the action to satisfy
if such an action exists, and denoteâ(θ, m) = ∞ otherwise. This action by the Receiver would give Sender-type θ his equilibrium payoff after sending m.
If such an action exists, it is unique by monotonicity. The single-crossing property suggests that higher types need less compensation for sending higher messages than do lower types. Lemma 1 strengthens that idea, applying it relative to equilibrium payoffs. Proofs of all Lemmas appear in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 Fix an equilibrium (M, A, µ) and type
The next lemma states that in this monotonic environment, when searching for a potential deviators' club, it suffices to find a type θ who would prefer to be self-identified by an off-equilibrium message, while no lower type would prefer to be perceived as θ . (M, A, µ) , and suppose there exists a type θ and an out-of-equilibrium message m such that
Lemma 2 Fix an equilibrium
u * S (θ ) < u S (θ , m , β(θ , m )) and u * S (θ) ≥ u S (θ, m , β(θ , m )) ∀θ < θ .
Then there exists a unique credible deviators' club for m .
The explanation for this result has two parts. First, in the monotonic setting, the Sender is made worse off as the Receivers beliefs shift towards lower types. Therefore, the "worst" belief over any club C is the one putting probability one on the lowest type in C. If C satisfies (1), then the inequalities of the lemma must be satisfied for θ = min C. Furthermore these inequalities are sufficient since adding higher types to a set C does not change the set BR (min C, m) . This explains why the inequalities generate some credible deviators' club.
The uniqueness result also relies on monotonicity. Since lower types cannot gain by sending m when being perceived as θ , they also cannot gain by being perceived as themselves, and hence cannot belong to any club C. If only higher types formed a club C by sending m , θ would want to join this club; hence θ must belong to any club that exists, and be the minimum member. But then all types in C would want to join such a club, since θ is the "worst case" member.
This result rules out pooling (or semi-pooling). The intuition for the following lemma is that the highest type θ in any pooling set would be able to find a sufficiently high message m with which to satisfy the inequalities of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 If an equilibrium (M, A, µ) is not Vulnerable to Credible Deviations, it is a separating equilibrium-no two types send the same message.
Finally, of all the separating equilibria, only the least-distortive one is not Vulnerable. In a separating equilibrium, each type θ i ∈ Θ is uniquely identified by his equilibrium message 
and for all 1 < i ≤ n, The uniqueness of such messages is guaranteed by our quasi-concavity assumption. Due to the single-crossing assumption, the Riley messages m r i also are increasing in i. This is obvious when messages are always costly, but it also holds on our more-general class of games.
Lemma 4 Any equilibrium whose outcome is different from the Riley outcome is Vulnerable to Credible Deviations.
The intuition for this result is that, if a separating equilibrium has a "gap" between equilibrium messages beyond that of the Riley outcome, then some type would be able to lower his message and still maintain the inequalities of Lemma 2. It immediately yields our main result.
Theorem 1 The Riley outcome is the unique equilibrium outcome that is not Vulnerable to Credible Deviations.
Proof: Lemma 4 makes any other outcome Vulnerable. To prove that the Riley outcome is not Vulnerable, observe from Cho and Sobel (1990) that the Riley outcome can be supported by a sequential equilibrium (in fact, with out-of-equilibrium beliefs that satisfy D1). Fix such an equilibrium, and suppose toward contradiction that C is a deviators' club for some outof-equilibrium message m , i.e. eqn. ((1)) holds for m = m . Denote the lowest type in C as θ i = min C. As in the proof of Lemma 2, due to the monotonicity of the Receiver's best responses with respect to beliefs, and the monotonicity of u S with respect to a, we have
Therefore for any j < i, since θ j / ∈ C we have
These are precisely the constraints in (5), which define m Theorem 1 shows that on this class of games, Credible Deviations exist if and only if D1 fails. As we show in the next section, however, this similarity breaks down even on a similar class of games, when we slightly weaken the monotonic structure.
Information Transmission and Bias
In this section we consider a class of games which conveys the following type of interaction. The Sender wants the Receiver to take an action that matches his type; messages are costly; and the Receiver wants to take an action that matches the Sender's type offset by some bias. This is a version of Crawford and Sobel's (1982) model, but with discrete types and costly signaling. We shall analyze the case in which the bias is not "too small". In order to impose this restriction without making assumptions on the prior distribution of types, we assume that the bias is not small relative to the distance between any two types.
Assumption: The bias is not too small: b > (θ n − θ 1 )/2.
To get intuition for the role of the bias assumption in our results, see Figure 2 . In this model, the no-small-bias assumption-coupled with the fact that b > 0-implies that a low type prefers to be perceived as any higher type. For instance, θ 1 prefers the action a = θ n − b to the action a = θ 1 − b, due to the symmetry of the distance function. In the monotonic games of Section 3, this feature of low types wanting to be perceived as high types is more general in that the Sender always prefers any higher action to a lower one. Therefore our bias assumption in this section preserves some of this incentive in a slightly richer model.
We now show that in this class of games there exists a unique outcome im-mune to Credible Deviations, while the D1 criterion does not always restrict the set of equilibria.
Credible Equilibrium
The only equilibrium outcome immune to Credible Deviations involves separation. It is the unique outcome that minimizes the Sender's messages subject to the incentive constraints: θ 1 sends m 1 = 0, θ 2 sends a different message m 2 low enough to make θ 1 indifferent between sending m 1 = 0 and deviating to m 2 , and so on. In this sense, this outcome resembles the Riley outcome in Section 3.
To formalize this, observe that in any separating equilibrium (M, A, µ), the Receivers equilibrium actions clearly satisfy
We define a minimal-cost separating equilibrium to be one where A satisfies that condition, and additionally, M (θ 1 ) = 0 while for 2 ≤ i ≤ n,
(6) which states that θ i−1 is indifferent between sending his equilibrium message M (θ i−1 ) and sending M (θ i ). Because of the assumption that the bias is not too small, these messages are uniquely defined and strictly monotonic.
To prove that this is the unique surviving equilibrium, we show that in any other equilibrium, a credible deviators' club must exist in one of two ways. First, there could exist a separating type who is greater than any pooling types (if they exist), but for whom eqn. (6) fails to hold. In the proof of Lemma 5 we show that if any such types exist, the highest of them would form a unique deviators' club. Second, there could exist pooling types. Using the previous case's result, we show (Lemma 6) that the highest one then would form a unique deviators' club. Hence we arrive at Theorem 2: There can be no pooling, and the separating equilibrium must be the one defined above. Alternating applications of Lemmas 5 and 6 prove the main result.
Lemma 5 Suppose an equilibrium (M, A, µ) is immune to

Theorem 2 If an equilibrium (M, A, µ) is immune to Credible Deviations then it is a minimal-cost separating equilibrium:
Proof: If an equilibrium is immune to Credible Deviations, then Lemma 6 implies that the highest type, θ n , does not pool. Hence Lemma 5 implies that eqn. (6) holds for i = n.
In turn, this means (again with Lemma 6) that θ n−1 does not pool; hence Lemma 5 implies that eqn. (6) also holds for i = n − 1. Continuing this argument for i = n − 2, n − 3, . . . , 2, θ i does not pool and eqn. (6) holds.
Therefore θ 1 also does not pool. It remains to be shown that M (θ 1 ) = 0. This is true in any separating equilibrium, though, under our assumption θ n − θ 1 < 2b. Indeed, the Receiver's equilibrium response A(M (θ 1 )) = θ 1 −b is the worst rationalizable action the Receiver could take (from θ 1 's perspective), regardless of beliefs. Given this, M (θ 1 ) = 0 is strictly best for θ 1 .
D1 and Pooling
In order to see that the D1 Criterion may fail to select a unique outcome in the class of games examined in this section, consider a 2-type example where θ 1 = 2, θ 2 = 5, b = 2, and the prior is π(θ 2 ) = 0.9. These parameters satisfy our previous bias-assumption, namely
There exists a pooling-equilibrium (M, A, µ) such that M (θ) ≡ 0 and, accordingly, A(0) = E(θ) − b = 4.7 − 2 = 2.7. We show that if A(m) = θ 1 − b = 0 and µ(θ 1 | m) = 1 for all m > 0, then the equilibrium satisfies D1.
To see this, we examine the potential gains from deviation for both types. Observe that regardless of the Receiver's (posterior) beliefs, he would never choose an action outside the range [θ 1 − b, θ 2 − b] = [0, 3]; hence we can restrict attention to that interval. For m ∈ (0, 0.6), both types could gain from deviation. In those cases, however, (1.3 + m, 2.7 − m) ∩ (2.7 + m/2, 3] = ∅, i.e. the sets of actions which make the two types better-off are not related by inclusion (and in fact do not even overlap). Hence D1 does not restrict out-of-equilibrium beliefs following such a message.
For m ∈ [0.6, 0.7), only θ 1 could gain from deviation; D1 therefore requires µ(θ 1 |m) = 1. For m ≥ 0.7, neither type can gain from deviation and D1 places no restrictions µ().
Therefore the pooling equilibrium satisfies the D1 Criterion. Since the Receiver responds with action A(m) = θ 1 − b = 0 for m > 0, neither type could gain by deviating. On the other hand, this equilibrium is Vulnerable to Credible Deviations since C = {θ 2 } is a unique credible deviators' club for various out-of-equilibrium messages.
It is clear that this example is robust to perturbations. More extreme priors would yield the same results, making the out-of-equilibrium beliefs we used (with unit probability on the low type) even less appealing while still satisfying D1. Furthermore, due to the slack in our arguments, it is clear that there even exist D1 equilibria in which all types pool by sending some positive message m > 0.
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Type θ 2 could also gain for some values a > 3, but we have stated such an action is never a best response for the Receiver.
Conclusion
We have shown that some equilibria of Sender-Receiver games are vulnerable to a particular kind of signaling. Credible signals identify a set of deviating types who gain by deviating as long as the Receiver reacts as if only such types could be deviating. Generally, this vulnerability is not captured by standard concepts in the refinements literature. While Credible Deviations are eliminated on the class of monotonic signaling games (Section 3) by, for example, Cho and Kreps' (1987) D1 Criterion, this does not happen in a related class of games (Section 4) where best response sets are not ordered (see also the example in Section 1.1).
On the other hand we wish to emphasize the point that immunity from Credible Deviations does not, by itself, serve well as a generally predictive concept. In some games all equilibria may be Vulnerable to Credible Deviations. This reinforces the fact that our primary goal is not to propose an equilibrium refinement that selects a unique equilibrium in every game. Instead it is to be aware of a type of non-robustness which some (or all) equilibria may possess in Sender-Receiver games that are used in applications.
The basis for our approach is centered on our view that the Receiver's beliefs (and subsequent action) in response to a deviant message m should be regarded as ambiguous to the Sender. While previous work has allowed agents' beliefs to differ off the equilibrium path (e.g. Fudenberg and Levine (1993) ), ours is the first formalization (to our knowledge) which explicitly allows ambiguity of the Receiver's beliefs from the Sender's perspective. ) (by definition and uniqueness ofâ()). Therefore the incentive constraints for θ yield
) by monotonicity of u S . The derivative of (3) with respect to m is zero, so
for any θ and m. By the single-crossing condition, for any m,
Recall thatâ(θ , m
Proof of Lemma 2. Let θ and m satisfy the inequalities in the lemma. We show that the unique set of types to satisfy (1) is
The inequalities imply θ ∈ C , and in fact that θ = min C . By monotonicity of u S () in a and by monotonicity of the Receiver's best response with respect to beliefs, respectively, we have, for any θ ∈ Θ,
= u S (θ, m , β(θ , m )) Hence C satisfies (1) with respect to m (showing existence).
To show that C is the unique such set, let C satisfy (1). For any θ < θ , monotonicity of the Receiver's best response implies
where the last inequality follows from the lemma's assumption. Hence no such type can belong to a deviators' club for m . Hence min C ≥ θ .
If min C = θ > θ , then again by monotonicity of the Receiver's best responses, for any a ∈ BR(C, m ),
But this contradicts the fact θ / ∈ C. Hence θ = min C. By (9), a credible deviators' club is uniquely determined by its minimum element; no two distinct clubs can have the same minimum element. Hence C = C defined by (8).
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose to the contrary that some equilibrium message m e is sent by several types, the highest of which is θ . (θ, m , β(θ , m ) ). By continuity, there is an out of equilibrium message m < m (sufficiently close to m ) such that u * S (θ ) < u S (θ , m , β(θ , m ) ) and for all θ < θ , u * S (θ) > u S (θ, m , β(θ , m ) ). By Lemma 2, there exists a unique deviators' club with respect to m . m, β(θ i , m) ) subject to the constraints of (5) (since the maximizer m r i is unique, by strict quasi-concavity in m). That is, (Existence) Incentive compatibility implies
where the strictness follows from the choice of j. By assumption, either θ j−1 is a separating type, or pools only with lower types. Therefore the Receiver's response to
With our assumption that the bias is not too small, this makes the left hand side of (10) positive. The right hand side then implies m j > m j−1 .
) by the single-crossing property of c. Combining these two inequalities with (10) we get (θ , m ) . Adding it to the previous inequality yields
for all < j − 1. With (10) this establishes that any θ < θ j strictly prefers his equilibrium payoff to imitating type θ j . In the case that j < n, types θ j and θ j+1 both separate by assumption, and θ j is indifferent between sending m j and m j+1 :
Since θ j+1 − θ j < 2b, the left hand side of the equality is positive.
By the convexity of d and the single-crossing property of c, for all h > j, (θ h , m j+1 ). Adding these two inequalities yields
Hence any θ h > θ j strictly prefers his equilibrium payoff to imitating type θ j .
By continuity, this implies that C = {θ j } satisfies (1) for any message m j − ε, as long as ε > 0 is kept sufficiently small so as not to violate the strict inequalities established above. Only type θ j would gain from sending m j − ε if the Receiver would react to it with the action a = θ j − b.
(Uniqueness) We complete the proof by showing that there is no other deviators' club for message m j − ε, whenever ε is sufficiently small.
For θ < θ j to belong to a deviators' club requires that he gain even when the Receiver believes the message came from θ , i.e.
. Adding this to (11) yields
The left hand side of this inequality, which can be written
is positive because 0 < θ j − θ < 2b. Hence for sufficiently small ε > 0, this inequality is violated; θ < θ j cannot belong to any credible deviators' club C for message m j − ε, when ε > 0 is sufficiently small.
On the other hand, suppose some deviators' club for m j − ε consisted only of types higher than θ j . Similar reasoning as above implies that θ j would want to "join that club" since |θ j − (θ h − b)| < |θ j − (θ j − b)| when θ h < θ j , i.e. θ j is even better off when the Receiver believes the message was sent by θ h than when the Sender believes it was θ j . This contradicts the fact that such a club C exists without θ j .
Therefore, any such club C must contain θ j . But we have already proven that no other type gains by sending m j − ε when the Receiver chooses a = θ j − b. We conclude that {θ j } is the unique deviators' club for (any out-ofequilibrium) message m j − ε when ε > 0 is chosen sufficiently small, making the equilibrium Vulnerable to a Credible Deviation.
Proof of Lemma 6. Denote m i ≡ M (θ i ) and a i ≡ A (M (θ i )) .
Letm p denote the message that would give θ p his his equilibrium payoff if the Receiver would respond with action a = θ p − b, i.e.
We shall prove that {θ p } is a unique deviators' club for some messagem p − ε. First, we show that for all i = p, if θ i would sendm p and the Receiver would respond with a = θ p − b, then θ i would be strictly worse off than he is in equilibrium, i.e.
To prove this claim we separately address types lower and higher than θ p . (Low Types) Since θ p is the highest pooling type, the Receiver's response to his equilibrium message is a p < θ p − b. This implies that the left hand side of eqn. (12) (High Types) Lemma 5 says that θ p+1 (if it exists) separates from θ p at the least cost, that is,
Since |θ 
This establishes (13) for all θ i > θ p . We finish the proof by arguing that for any sufficiently small ε, {θ p } is the unique credible deviators' club with respect to messagem p − ε. Since these arguments are mostly the same as those used in the end of the proof of Lemma 5, we keep these arguments brief.
Continuity in eqn. (13) implies that for sufficiently small ε, C = {θ p } satisfies (1) with respect to messagem p −ε. To show that no other deviators' club C can exist, first consider θ < θ p . Since 0 < θ p − θ < 2b, any such θ would prefer the Receiver to take action θ p − b rather than θ − b. Hence by transitivity and (13), θ cannot belong to a deviators' club for messagê m p − ε, as in the proof of Lemma 5.
Finally, if a deviators' club consisted only of higher types θ h , θ p would want to join that club, which is a contradiction. Hence θ p belongs to any such C, in which case (13) implies θ h could not belong to the club for messagê m p −ε, preferring his equilibrium payoff to the one he gets when the Receiver responds with action a = θ p − b.
